THE DOCTRINE OF FRUITS OF A POISONOUS TREE AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN INDIA: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

Abstract

In the criminal justice system of India, the primary consideration governing the admission or rejection of evidence has traditionally been its relevancy rather than the legality of its procurement. The doctrine of fruits of a poisonous tree, which prevents the use of evidence derived from an illegal source and discourages law enforcement agencies from engaging in unlawful conduct while collecting evidence, has found no strict application in Indian law. The settled position of Indian courts has been that, absent a statutory or constitutional provision excluding a particular type of evidence, the mere fact that evidence was obtained illegally is of no consequence, notwithstanding that such evidence may at times be procured through means that violate the basic human and constitutional rights of citizens. The Supreme Court's judgment in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, recognising privacy as a fundamental right, unsettles this position and raises a pointed question: can courts continue to exercise discretion to admit illegally obtained evidence once the method of its procurement itself constitutes a breach of a fundamental right? This paper analyses the legal position governing the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence in India, situates it against the doctrine's comparative origins, traces its treatment across the pre- and post-Puttaswamy case law, and argues that the continued absence of a statutory exclusionary standard, despite the Law Commission's decades-old recommendation to enact one, leaves a genuine and unresolved tension between the constitutional right to privacy and the public interest in a fair criminal trial.