FROM MONTESQUIEU TO MODERN INDIA: SEPARATION OF POWERS IN CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE

Abstract

The doctrine of separation of powers, as enunciated by Montesquieu to prevent tyranny, has undergone a considerable transformation in modern constitutional systems. The Constitution of India does not adopt a strict separation of powers between the legislative, executive and judicial branches; instead, it provides for a functional separation accompanied by a system of checks and balances. This paper examines the transformation of the separation of powers doctrine in India, tracing how the constitutional system has adapted Montesquieu's classical formulation to the governance needs of a welfare state. Adopting a doctrinal methodology grounded in constitutional text, judicial interpretation and comparative constitutional theory, the paper critically analyses the judiciary's role in scrutinising legislative and executive action and the resulting institutional tension. It argues that the Indian constitutional model represents a dynamic and pragmatic application of separation of powers rather than strict compartmentalisation, in which institutional overlap is constitutionally permissible provided it does not impair the essential functions of any organ, a principle the judiciary has since elevated to the status of a basic feature of the Constitution. The paper concludes that this flexible interpretation has strengthened constitutional governance even as it continues to test the boundaries of institutional restraint in contemporary India.