AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN EDUCATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL EQUALITY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT'S 2026 JUDGMENT

Abstract

Access to schooling has long been shaped by social and economic divisions that quietly reproduce inequality across generations. The promise of equal opportunity cannot be realised if children grow up in separate and unequal educational spaces. Over time, the law has responded to this concern by recognising that meaningful access requires more than admission; it requires inclusion within shared institutions. The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 reflects this shift through its mandate that private unaided schools admit children from weaker sections at entry level. The twenty-five per cent inclusion requirement is designed to prevent parallel systems of schooling and to ensure that classrooms become socially diverse spaces, creating a critical mass so that children from disadvantaged backgrounds participate with confidence rather than isolation. This paper examines the Supreme Court's January 2026 judgment in Dinesh Biwaji Ashtikar v. State of Maharashtra, which confronted the gap between this statutory promise and its administrative implementation, and argues that the decision reshapes the constitutional understanding of State responsibility for inclusive schooling by treating Section 12(1)(c) as a binding obligation rather than discretionary welfare policy. The paper traces the constitutional evolution of the Economically Weaker Sections category, examines the statutory architecture of the Right to Education Act, and evaluates the judgment's contribution to transformative constitutionalism before proposing concrete measures to close the persistent gap between legal entitlement and lived access.