SENTENCING DISCRETION AND THE RIGHT TO LIFE AND PERSONAL LIBERTY UNDER ARTICLE 21

Abstract

Sentencing discretion occupies a pivotal position in criminal adjudication, yet its exercise directly implicates the constitutional guarantee of life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. In light of the Supreme Court's expansive reading of Article 21, this paper examines the constitutional constraints that now bear on a judge's discretionary power to impose sentence. Sentencing has become progressively constitutionalised along the lines of fairness, non-arbitrariness and substantive due process, and this paper traces that conceptual shift from A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras to Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, before examining the specific doctrinal developments the shift produced: the rarest of rare doctrine, the proportionality principle, the constitutional difficulty mandatory minimum sentencing generates, and the trajectory of death penalty jurisprudence more broadly. Comparing Indian sentencing practice against the more structured approaches adopted in the United States and the United Kingdom, the paper offers a critical assessment of the sentencing disparity and doctrinal inconsistency that continue to characterise Indian criminal adjudication in the absence of codified guidelines. It argues that while judicial discretion remains essential to individualised justice, that discretion must operate within constitutional parameters Articles 14 and 21 jointly establish, and it concludes by advocating structured yet flexible sentencing standards capable of preserving fairness, proportionality and human dignity within India's criminal justice system.