THE IMPASSE OVER JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS: COLLEGIUM V. NATIONAL JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS COMMISSION

Abstract

The independence of the judiciary is a cardinal principle of the Indian Constitution, a dynamic concept encompassing freedom from pressure or prejudice from any quarter. Yet that principle has remained a simmering source of tension between the executive and the judiciary, centred specifically on the procedure for appointing judges to the higher judiciary. The Collegium system is considered by the executive to be too opaque, while the courts have repeatedly held that including the executive in the appointment process risks producing politically partisan appointment. This paper compares the Collegium system and the National Judicial Appointments Commission as competing models for judicial appointment, tracing their doctrinal origins through the Judges Cases and the Fourth Judges Case that struck the Commission down, and examines the accountability gap the 2025-26 controversy surrounding Justice Yashwant Varma has since exposed within the Collegium's own in-house mechanism. Drawing on comparative practice, particularly the United Kingdom's Judicial Appointments Commission, and on Parliament's most recent legislative attempt at reform, the paper argues that the underlying dispute is best resolved not by reallocating appointment power between the executive and the judiciary, but by establishing clear, published criteria and transparent procedure capable of commanding public confidence regardless of which institution exercises the appointing power.