ANTI-DEFECTION LAW OF INDIA: AN ENFORCEMENT DEFICIT

Abstract

The Anti-Defection Law of India is amenable to misuse, and a new trend of defection has emerged. Elected representatives are chosen by voters on the basis of their idea, manifesto, and the political party symbol they represent, yet after election they frequently cross over to another party in power under a different idea, manifesto, and symbol. The exception clause enshrined in paragraph 4 of the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution permits the merger of an original political party with another where two-thirds of that party's legislative members agree to it. Under the guise of merger, splitters break the original party organisation, defy the whip, and claim themselves the party's central commanding authority, thereby escaping the application of the anti-defection law under paragraph 2 of the Tenth Schedule. Consequently, the original party leader loses central command authority, becomes trapped in prolonged legal battle, and most likely loses, as occurred in Maharashtra. This paper undertakes a comparative analysis of the jurisprudential aspects of defection law in other jurisdictions and a critical examination of the efficacy and challenges of the anti-defection law under the Indian Constitution in light of current political developments and judicial trends, and proposes concrete legislative and judicial reforms to address the situation that has newly emerged.